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I. INTRODUCTION-HIGHLIGHTED AIR TRANSPORT
ISSUES IN SPAIN
BERIA AIRLINES CURRENTLY finds itself in dire economic
straits. According to some analysts, the company is under the
* The author wishes to thank Dr. Gaspar Arifio Ortiz, Director of the
Programa de Estudios de Regulaci6n Econ6mica, Universidad Aut6noma de Ma-
drid, for research funding support.
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risk of bankruptcy.1 Spain's leading national carrier claims its
financial difficulties have been ones not experienced by other
European airlines. The difficulties were emphasized in 1995
when Iberia made efforts to renegotiate the European Commis-
sion's second grant of state aid. The outcome of that renegoti-
ation was not as successful as Iberia had projected. The
Commission granted only 87 billion of the requested 130 billion
pesetas in aid.2 Moreover, the Commission may add a future
injection of 20 billion pesetas on the condition that Iberia meet
its plan to achieve economic viability and improved competitive-
ness.' The Commission also obliges Iberia to sell its assets in
Aerolineas Argentinas and Ladeco, two of its Latin American af-
filiates, for 15 billion pesetas.4
Iberia faces economic pressure from several sources. It must
contend with the rapid proliferation of private airline competi-
tors, the consequent loss of passenger load on those national air
routes served by these lower fare competitors, and the obliga-
tion to lower its own fares in order to compete. Added to these
pressures is the proposal of Iberia's airline pilots union (SEPLA)
to study the possibility of establishing their own air carrier.5
Iberia's president responded by threatening to take the matter
to court if a conflict of interest arose.6
This Essay will discuss the economic and deregulation factors
shaping Iberia's competitive position. Important management
and investment decisions that Iberia has made in recent years
and which have influenced its current economic state will also
be discussed. Challenges faced by Iberia offer useful lessons to
those national carriers which are contemplating possible ad-
vancements under the free market competition promised by air
transport liberalization in general, and in particular, by that lib-
eralization to be effective in Europe by April 1997.
Iberia has a history of seeking financial support from the Eu-
ropean Commission. September 1995 marked the European
I Julian Gonzdlez & Carlos Segovia, Juan Sdez reconoce que la tiltima huelga de
pilotos deja Iberia "al borde de la quiebra," EL MUNDO, Nov. 8, 1995, at 65. Even
Iberia's president, Juan Sdez, recognized that the company was "on the verge of
bankruptcy" after a series of pilot strikes in November 1995. Id.
2 Walter Oppenheimer, La Comisi6n Europea aprueba hy la ampliaci6n del capital
de Iberia en 87.000 millones de pesetas, EL PMs, Jan. 31, 1996, at 45.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 El SEPLA decide estudiar la creaci6n de una compariia ahrea sin haberse cerrado el
conflicto con Iberia, EL PAls, Jan. 24, 1996, at 45.
6 Competencia en las nubes, EL PAs, Jan. 28, 1996, at 1, 2.
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Commission's rejection of Iberia's second request for a cash rei-
njection totalling 130 billion pesetas (U.S. $1 billion), to be
used to overcome Iberia's crippling debt and embark on a new
restructuring plan.7 Two years before, the Commission applied
its "one time, last time" rule on granting Iberia an injection of
120 billion pesetas to help finance a restructuring plan which
was to restore the flag carrier to economic health and profitabil-
ity." On Iberia's approved, initial petition, competing airlines
such as British Airways, which have managed to turn a profit
without relying on state aid, complained that the grant
amounted to unfair competition.9 In spite of these complaints
during Iberia's first petition for aid, the Commission extended
Iberia 120 billion pesetas in aid."°
When Iberia submitted its second petition for aid, the state-
run carrier justified its request by qualifying its circumstances as
"exceptional," described as the existence of fewer travelers after
the Gulf War, currency fluctuations, and the world recession.11
While exceptional circumstances are required for supplemental
grants of Commission aid, the Commission and the general
opinion has been that the exceptional circumstances described
by Iberia have been common to all European airlines and not to
the petitioner alone.
At this writing, Iberia and its affiliates are struggling finan-
cially against the effects of a more than seventeen day SEPIA
strike during November and December 1995, with daily losses of
approximately 700 million pesetas on cancellation of some 340
flights per strike day, more than half of the estimated 608 daily
scheduled flights.12 The pilots union demanded that Iberia
management follow through on a 1994 proposed restructuring
plan which included revamping directorship strategies and per-
sonnel. In support of its position, SEPIA proposed an outside
consultant's analysis by Barclays Zoete-Wedd.13 Barclays' evalua-





12 Los pilotos de Iberia y Aviaco mantienen la huelga sin que haya acercamiento con las
empresas, EL PAs, Nov. 7, 1995, at 60. The International Herald Tribune reported
Iberia's total losses from the inception of the strike until November 8, 1995, its
reporting date, as 2.46 billion pesetas (U.S. $20 million). Iberia Sees No Relief on
Pilots' Strike, INT'L HERALD TRi., Nov. 8, 1995, at 2.
1s Iberia necesita una ampliaci6n de capital de 100.000 millones como minimo, seg~in
Barclays, EL PAis, Nov. 7, 1995, at 61.
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tion1 4 concluded that, in light of the carrier's 93.7 million peseta
debt, Iberia needed added capital amounting to 100 billion pe-
setas, an amount independent of the possible indebtedness of
its affiliates. 15
The president of Iberia, meanwhile, presented to Spain's par-
liamentary members an optimistic view of the company's cir-
cumstances by claiming that Iberia's losses through October
1995 exceeded 9 billion pesetas, over 5 billion pesetas less than
the anticipated losses for the same period.16 He also stressed
that fulfillment of pilot demands would lead Iberia and its affili-
ates to bankruptcy. 17 The pilots union claims that Iberia's man-
agement has faltered in meeting terms and conditions in its
original 1994 agreement, including failing to: (1) regain finan-
cial stability by the agreed date; (2) reorganize the company's
business activities; (3) cut company costs through transparent
information sharing and negotiations with the appropriate
workers' unions; (4) renew the company's aircraft fleet as re-
quired; (5) improve management's dealings in labor relations
with Iberia workers; (6) permit pilots' union voting/stock-own-
14 The Barclays de Zoete Wedd report, issued in the summer of 1995, made
the following suggestions for Iberia's improvement:
-strengthening management toward more independent deci-
sion-making;
-improvement of organizational structure;
-need to develop a long-range global strategy plan for the com-
pany and its affiliates;
-permanent revision of its business plan;
-detailed analysis of company costs and improvement of finan-
cial flows and reporting systems;
-improvement of investment evaluation and decision-making
processes;
-urgent rationalization and renovation of aircraft fleet;
-detailed evaluation of all company activities and how each con-
tributes to business objectives and investment opportunities;
-urgent evaluation of all investments made in Latin American
affiliates;
-outline a plan for haiqdling activities which takes into account
the effects of liberalization, and consider the creation of one or
several independent affiliates so as to increase transparency and
eventually contemplate opportunities to divest; and
-clearly define the competitive advantages of maintenance serv-
ices as well as consider subcontracting in this area.
Id.
15 Id.
16 Iberia pierde hasta octubre 9.035 millones, 5.171 menos de to previsto, EL PAls, Nov.




ing representation within the company board of directors; (7)
create and work consistently with a commission to oversee
Iberia's restructuring plan; and (8) honor the results of the Bar-
clays-Zoete Wedd evaluation.1 8 The Spanish government's reac-
tion has been to redirect its Minister of Industry to European
Commission officials in the hope of renegotiating the Commis-
sion's latest refusal to grant the full amount of aid requested on
second petition by Iberia. 19
II. ECONOMIC REGULATION OF AIR TRANSPORT
The industry organization of air transport may take the form
of a publicly owned company which meets the market demand
by monopolistic behavior." Another form of regulation is that
of systematic concessions granted to those bidding companies
that commit themselves to provide a given service during a spec-
ified period in the most efficient and cost-effective manner. 1
Yet another method of regulation is that emitted by an adminis-
trative body which has the authority to grant a limited number
of licenses to various air carriers which are to provide a specified
service in a given area or route and under agreed conditions in
exchange for a direct subsidy.22 At the other end of the regula-
tory spectrum, a market may function under the impetus of
competition having no restrictions on market entry.23 This sec-
tion will analyze the positive and negative repercussions of each
of these approaches.
A. PUBLIC PROPERTY AND MONOPOLIES
Public monopolistic industries arise in instances where com-
petition is not possible, where it is not desirable, or where im-
portant external factors necessitate their existence. 4 In air
transportation, it is frequently the case that the relationship be-
tween the minimal size and indivisibility of the unit of produc-
tion and level of market demand is such that a natural
monopoly exists. 5 Moreover, when economies of scale do not
18 Iberia y el Sepla, enfrentados por un plan, EXPANSI6N, Sept. 26, 1995, at 4.
19 Id.
20 JoSE C. CARBAJO & GNts DE Rus, 1A DESREGULACION DEL TRANSPORTE EN Es-
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have a significant impact, regulatory authorities frequently con-
sider that the duplication of services would cause such a loss of
resources that they will permit the creation of a publicly or pri-
vately managed monopoly through a system of granted conces-
sions.6 This is the case of Iberia in Spain, where the regular (as
opposed to charter) transportation of passengers is a public ser-
vice rendered by a national monopoly.2 7 One of the salient
characteristics of such monopolies is their disposition to prac-
tice tariff discrimination, where for the same service, different
consumers are charged different prices-for example, early
ticket purchase versus last minute ticket purchase priced differ-
ently for the same travel route.28 The justification and social
benefit of such discrimination is that of achieving higher com-
pany output when fare discrimination is practiced than when all
consumers pay the same fare.29 Where restrictions on the entry
of competitors exist, it is advisable that possible increments in
output over time be recognized so that public subsidies may be
conditioned on uniform or multi-tariff price-fixing schemes."
B. MARKET COMPETITION
One of the drawbacks of natural monopolies is the inability to
take the greatest advantage of economies of scale by a single
company without creating monopolistic power." One regula-
tory solution against this result is to create market competition
by allowing market entry to various operators so that they may
compete to become the most efficient, and consequently, only
server of the market.32 In most cases, a market entry concession
is granted when the selected company commits to rendering a
service for the lowest price or the best quality relative to price.
Nonetheless, a system of regulated concessions granted to new
market entrants does not always work favorably, especially in
light of the inherent dangers of collusive pricing among a re-
duced number of entrants or the existence of bidders that stand
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 4.
2 Id.
so Id. at 7.
31 Id. at 8.
32 Id. at 8-9.
33 Id. at 9.
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at such an advantage before other companies that they, in ef-
fect, have no competitors.3 4
C. REGULATION AND SUBSIDIES
Where an industry requires large start-up investments and
provides a service that is of public benefit, such as air transport,
public subsidies are granted to assure that the service is main-
tained under a scheme of regulated fares or other conditions.3 5
The source of financing of some subsidies can come out of a
highly profitable service area to a less profitable service area that
is to be maintained in the same sector.3 6 On the other hand,
there are also public subsidies which arise as direct, one-shot
contributions to assist a company in surviving otherwise unantic-
ipated market dynamics, but which, if allocated intelligently,
must ensure that the derived benefits compensate for the possi-
ble negative effects on the costs involved.37 It may be argued
that the indirect subsidy from a more to less profitable service
can lead to a lessening of public benefit and economic losses for
a company.38 While the more profitable service is supporting
the less profitable one, the former is often not able to expand to
maximum levels of output and the costs of providing the less
profitable service is undervalued by the consumer.3 9
D. FOSTERING COMPETITION
Regulation which fosters market competition takes the form
of prohibiting anti-competitive practices, for example, collusive
agreements between companies to fix prices. 40 Another ap-
proach is to dismantle any barriers to entering the market.
Eliminating any quantitative limits on the number of permissi-
ble operators in a given market is an example of this. 4
1
The latter form of fostering market competition is known as
deregulation.42 Deregulation provides two advantages: (1) it
improves the internal managerial efficiency of companies under
the disciplinary pressure of market competition; and (2) it en-
34 Id. at 8-9.
35 Id. at 13.
3 Id.
37 Id.
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courages innovation as a response to rival companies introduc-
ing new products, services, or price structures.4 3 The theory of
contestable markets was applied in the deregulation of the air
transport industry in the United States, whereby operators
which serve a given market must function at maximum effi-
ciency or else new competitors will be able to enter the market
and threaten their replacement." The most frequent argument
made against deregulation is that free entry of all operators will
unnecessarily engender a duplication of certain fixed costs and
thus fails to maximize the desired public benefit.4
III. DEREGULATION OF THE AIR TRANSPORT
INDUSTRY
A. THE INFLUENCE OF DEREGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Motivating reasons which edged the United States toward der-
egulating domestic air transport were expressed clearly in the
1975 Report of the Civil Aeronautic Board Special Staff on Reg-
ulatory Reform.46 Those reasons included:
(1) de facto exclusion of new airlines from long-haul trunkline
markets; (2) protection of the relatively inefficient carriers; (3)
unduly high labour costs and unduly high-cost type of service;
and (4) lack of emphasis on price competition and on variations
in the price/quality mix in response to consumer preference.47
Between 1975 and 1978, the government applied various inter-
mediate measures to relax Civil Aeronautic Board (CAB) con-
trol over the industry and progressively recognized special offer
fares initiated by Texas International and American Airlines.48
In February 1977, President Carter proposed a new bill to Con-
gress that was designed to allow greater competition in the air-
line industry.49 This legislation, the Airline Deregulation Act,
was signed into law in October 1978.50 The Act eliminated most
restrictions on air fares and new competitors entering the mar-
43 Id. at 15.
44 Id. at 16.
45 Id. at 15.
46 RiGAs DOGANIS, FLYING OFF COURSE: THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL AIR-
LINES 51 (2d ed. 1991).
47 Id. (citing CIVIL AERONATICS BOARD, REPORT OF THE CAB SPECIAL STAFF ON
REGULATORY REFORM (1975)).





ket. The Act also provided for complete elimination of the CAB
regulatory body by 1985.5'
Looking back on the history of United States airline regula-
tion, it is of little surprise that the ultimate result would be one
of deregulation. Air transport regulation in the United States
began in 1938 to regulate interstate air travel fares and control
market entry. It also provided subsidies for the promotion of
what was then a nascent industry.2 The government's purpose
was to provide financial incentives for the industry to innovate,
grow, and continue offering a public benefit at affordable
costs.5 3 But it is not evident, even at that time, that price and
market entry regulation was necessary in order to offer contin-
ued public benefits at affordable costs. Perhaps public safety
was and continues to be a more persuasive basis for airline regu-
lation. Nevertheless, the industry was not a natural monopoly
given that its infrastructure was publicly financed, unrecoverable
costs (sunk costs) were relatively low, and economies of scale
were modest.54
It is evident that regulation per se did not successfully achieve
the CAB's general objectives. 5 Those objectives were to: foster
competition; ensure that industry operators offer adequate serv-
ices at efficient and reasonable prices; prevent unjustified price
discrimination; and promote "healthy economic conditions" for
the industry.5 6 In reality, the CAB suppressed competition by
limiting market entry and eliminating the possibility of rival
pricing measures.57 As a result, the possibility of furthering in-
novation and the price-quality balance of existing carriers and
new market entrants to the industry was diminished signifi-
cantly. 8 Between 1950 and 1974, the CAB received approxi-
mately eighty new air carrier applications to enter the market;
the CAB rejected each of them under the premise of giving
greater importance to protecting existing competitors than to
promoting the innovation that can come with competitive pres-
sures of new entrants to the market.5"
51 CARBAJO & DE Rus, supra note 20, at 22.
52 Id. at 20.
53 Id. at 21.
54 Id. at 20.
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The CAB's air fare regulations led to inefficiency and losses.
Airlines tended to increase the number of flights per route be-
cause of the CAB regulations. 60 This substantially reduced the
number of passengers per flight thereby resulting in inefficient
operations and losses.6 ' Moreover, existing airline companies,
severely restricted from serving new travel routes, limited their
search for the most profitable operations.62
Deregulation allowed airlines to renovate the industry. At the
threshold of U.S. deregulation in 1982, new entrants were al-
lowed into any market or route they were willing and able to
operate, leading to the "hub-spoke system".63 In addition to
routing, deregulation significantly improved other practices in
the industry. For example, airlines introduced air fare discrimi-
nation and innovated computerized air reservation systems. 64
Yet, while Spain and Europe as a whole look to these favorable
effects of deregulation, other less favorable aspects can be ob-
served. As a result of deregulation in the United States, air traf-
fic has increased significantly without the accompanied growth
of airport infrastructures, thus causing congestion in airports,
increased flight delays, and a need for greater security measures.
Additionally, prices have increased within those markets where
the demand for services is most concentrated.65 On balance,
however, deregulation has brought with it lower air fare prices
which more closely reflect actual costs, a greater range of con-
sumer choices in which quality-price factors are considered, and
increased efficiency of operations in the industry as a whole.66
B. AIR TRANSPORT DEREGULATION IN EUROPE
A key distinction made in the regulation of air transport in
Europe is that of regular and charter flight services. Each of
these services have different markets operating under distinctly
different conditions and controls. Charter carriers have a lower
cost of market entry, limited product line, and sell passenger
seats or travel package deals through intermediary travel
6 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 21-22.






agents.6 7 This ensures that at least a minimum capacity of each
flight is filled.68
Regular flight services are subject to the conditions of bilat-
eral agreements which must be approved by the governments of
the respective countries in which a flight route is serviced.69
These agreements specify permissible routes to be served be-
tween countries, the particular carriers to do so, and their pas-
senger capacity on such routes, in addition to a ceiling or
structure for air fares.70 Air carriers are known to complement
these bilateral agreements with confidential agreements that
modify the terms of the original agreement and specify require-
ments for passenger capacity, income distribution, and costs cov-
ered.71 These requirements ultimately impose limits on air tariff
prices and special travel offers which can be extended by either
carrier in the confidential agreement as well as by new entrants
seeking to serve the same market.72
These regulatory approaches have resulted in inefficiency and
limited air travel options to consumers in Europe. As a result,
the European Economic Community (E.E.C.) put in place its
multilateral and bilateral initiatives to deregulate air transport
in Europe, effective as of 1997.73 A primary basis for its initia-
tives was the application of Treaty of Rome Articles 85 and 86 to
the air transport sector.74 Article 85 "prohibits and makes unen-
forceable anti-competitive agreements, decisions and concerted
practices which eliminate, reduce or distort competition unless
specific exemptions have been granted."75 Article 86 "prohibits
an abuse of a dominant position within the Community or any
part of it so as to affect trade between EEC member states."76
While the E.E.C. did not specify particular agreements to be
prohibited, it was evident that capacity-sharing agreements,
tariff-fixing, and revenue pooling were anti-competitive under
Article 85 and thus unacceptable. v Nonetheless, the European
Commission was given the power to grant exemptions to such




71 Id. at 33.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 35.
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agreements so long as the exemptions involved only intra-Euro-
pean carriers and did not concern a non-Community carrier.78
The application of Article 86 presented greater complications
because of the difficulties in defining what constitutes a "domi-
nant position" within the E.E.C. It is generally recognized that a
dominant position consists of holding over forty percent of the
market share and retaining advantages not shared by competi-
tors, such as economies of scale and scope. 79 As enforced by the
European Commission and European Court ofJustice, the clear
prohibitions under Article 86 are that airlines may not:
-enter restrictive fare agreements;
-create exclusive dealings with travel agents by offering the
agents commissions;
-use computer reservation systems to obtain an undue advan-
tage over their competitors;
-restrict the purchase of supplies only to suppliers of their
own nationality;
-refuse to accept interline traffic from another airline with-
out sufficient justification;
-artificially create disadvantages for their competitors, such
as by tying up more terminal facilities or runway slots than neces-
sary; and
-use "predatory pricing" to force competitors out of a
market.8 0
The European Commission is perhaps the least supportive of
deregulation because its representatives must defend the gov-
ernment interests of their respective Member States. As early as
mid-1987, the Commission proposed and was prepared to ap-
prove measures which represented a global agreement on the
application of the Treaty of Rome to air transport in the Com-
munity.81 But Spain vetoed the proposal because the Commis-
sion refused to accept Gibraltar in the network of proposed
routes.8 2 By mid 1987, the Commission adopted measures in
conformity with the competition laws under the Treaty of Rome,
as they are applied to regular air transportation." The meas-
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 85.
81 CARBAJO & DE Rus, supra note 20, at 38.
82 Id.
83 Id.; see also DoGAis, supra note 46, at 84.
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ures covered air fares of regular air travel, as well as capacity
designation and market access:84
a) Member States may approve operator air fares so long as
they are reasonably related to long-term global costs. A proposed
tariff being lower than that of another carrier operating on the
same route is not sufficient justification to reject the proposal.
b) Establishment of two flexible air fare pricing zones: one
zone of reduced tariffs which includes fares from 90% to more
than 65% of the reference price; and another zone of highly re-
duced tariffs which comprises fares from 65% to 45% of the ref-
erence price;
c) Abandonment of the traditional methods in distributing ca-
pacity (50-50%), and establishment of a 55-45% capacity distribu-
tion until October 1989, with a 60-40% capacity distribution to
apply from that time onward, notwithstanding an exceptions
clause which permits a Member State to request a waiver of the
60-40% rule in cases in which it can show that its national flag
carrier has suffered "serious economic prejudice"; and
d) establishment of new market entry opportunities within
travel routes with more than 250,000 passengers.85
While Europe proceeds to relax its restrictions on competi-
tion, and gradually comes closer to deregulating air transport,
the United States experience suggests several lessons. It is advis-
able for Europe to make efforts to expand airport ground facili-
ties and to augment security measures in order to accommodate
increases in passenger flow caused by deregulation. While ana-
lyzing the U.S. experience, it is useful to bear in mind that Eu-
rope's economy and transport systems are different. Average
income levels in Europe are lower than in the U.S., with the
effect that Europeans travel less by air.86 Fuel in Europe is more
expensive and subject to higher taxes than in the U.S., thus
heightening the cost of air travel in Europe.87 People in Europe
travel by rail more frequently than in the U.S. because it is less
expensive than air travel and because geographical distances in
Europe are shorter.8 8 When they do fly, it is usually because
ground travel permits less speedy or convenient crossings such
as those of the British Channel, the Alps, or the Baltic Sea.89
84 Council Regulation 3976/87 of 14 December 1987, On the Application of
Competition Rules, 1987 OJ. (L374) 9-11.
85 CARBAJO & DE Rus, supra note 20, at 39.
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Deregulation inevitably leads to the failure of less efficient
carriers unable to withstand competitive pressures and their sub-
sequent acquisition or merger by more competitive carriers.
These mergers have had both negative and positive results: on
the one hand, the public loses because fares on certain routes
have increased, while on the other hand, there are gains for
consumers in the range of destinations and variety of special air
travel offers, such as accumulated mileage points.90 Carrier
mergers can cut back on some of the gains of deregulation, but
to counteract this, special measures have been applied. For ex-
ample, the monopoly of airport ground facilities and space by
certain companies is now subject to special taxing structures as
an incentive for carriers to curtail airport congestion.91 Certain
travel promotion programs are also taxed so as to balance with
those carriers not in a position to offer similar programs. 92 In-
ternational air carriers now may require reciprocal access to the
airport facilities in the respective countries of the companies in-
volved.93 In light of these consequences, government needs to
exercise antitrust policing powers in order to prevent anti-com-
petitive violations such as collusive pricing and market
dominance.
1. Tariffs: A Key to Competition
In order to combat a recent and significant downturn in the
number of passengers, a first-time price war has begun at the
initiative of Aviaco, an Iberia affiliate.94 For the moment, the
dramatic slashing of fares by almost fifty percent, with no adjust-
ments for costs, is limited to Aviaco's national flights. 9 5 Per Luf-
thansa Airlines President's suggestion that Iberia would do well
to reduce its prices, a discussion follows on developing fair and
competitive tariffs in which important consideration is given to
costs.
Under the existing competitive fare conditions of the air
transport market, "the key to successful revenue generation is
market knowledge, cost awareness and yield management."9 6 In
90 Id. at 28-29; see also DOGANIS, supra note 46, at 78.
91 CARBAJO & DE Rus, supra note 20, at 29.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 G. Gonzilez & R. Arbol, Aviaco desata una guerra de precios para parar su caida
en trdfico naciona4 CINco DiAs, Nov. 23, 1995, at 5.
95 Id.
96 DOGANIS, supra note 46, at 288.
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order to know their market, airline companies are obliged to
fully understand the market segments and the requirements in
each of their markets. 97 As to cost awareness, airlines must en-
sure that costs are covered fully within each traffic category they
carry, whether passengers or freight. Moreover, the feasibility of
investments in aircraft, new routes, and different products
should force an evaluation process of investment opportunities
which would lead to developing a sound pricing strategy accord-
ing to the demands of evolving market conditions.9 Yield man-
agement is also essential to competitive tariff-setting because
airlines under certain circumstances will decide to set prices ac-
cording to costs or according to the market, and in either case
yield managers must carefully evaluate costs and market evolu-
tions to properly project fair and competitive tariffs. 99
There are three categories of costs borne by airlines: variable
direct operating costs, fixed or standing direct costs, and indi-
rect operating costs.100 Variable costs are those avoided by not
servicing a flight route, such as "fuel costs, variable flight and
cabin crew costs, landing and en route charges." 10 1 Direct main-
tenance costs fall in this category and are the most difficult to
estimate because they can depend on the number of "block
hours flown on each route or a combination of block hours and
number of landings" on each route. 10 2 Fixed or standing costs
include "depreciation and insurance, the fixed annual flight
and cabin crew costs, and engineering overhead costs," which
are often calculated according to costs per block hour for each
aircraft type and route.1 3 Indirect operating costs include
ground station and service costs, passenger insurance and their
ground services, ticketing, sales and promotion costs, and gen-
eral administrative overheads.104
The need to maximize short term revenues and the low mar-
ginal costs of carrying additional passengers have led airlines to
develop a variety of different pricing strategies. 10 5 Once costs









105 Id. at 291.
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systems that they can adapt to the demands of their various mar-
ket segments; for example, off-peak rates for the non-business
class segment, separate rates for first class and business seg-
ments, economy and excursion fares for the tourist segment as
distinguished from charter rates, as well as advanced purchase,
on demand, and stand-by fares. 10 6 The role of yield managers is
to create marketing strategies which will ensure that the passen-
gers willing to pay the higher rates will not switch to lower fare
categories, and to prevent exce ss bookings at low fares, thus
maximizing the total revenue per flight.
10 7
Sometimes competitor's lower airline fares can be misleading
if "the competitor has lower unit costs [per passenger] or is
heavily subsidized by its government."108 Thus, marketing and
yield managers must carefully evaluate how to maximize reve-
nues even when faced with such competitors, and must remem-
ber that, regardless of the lower unit costs borne by a
competitor and their lower fares, an airline has the first and
foremost obligation to cover its own costs, maximize its reve-
nues, and meet its corporate objectives. 10 9
2. European Community's Stance on Competition
As discussed in Part III.B. above, the fare pricing zones estab-
lished under the 1987 E.E.C. measures have been used by few
airline companies, with an almost imperceptible effect in coun-
tries such as Great Britain, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland, and
Ireland, which had implemented greater pricing flexibility
through bilateral agreements. 110 Moreover, little visible change
from what was true of previous years was apparent in passenger
capacity distribution.111 In the end, air tariffs were less affected
by the 1987 E.E.C. measures than by a 1989 decision of the Eu-
ropean Court of Justice in the case of Ahmed Saeed
Flugreisen.' 1 2
The issue presented by the case was whether national authori-
ties had the right to enforce price fare limits on flights which
106 Id.
107 Id. at 293.
108 Id. at 295.
109 Id. at 296.
110 CARBAJO & DE Rus, supra note 20, at 40.
111 Id.
112 Case 66/86, Ahmed Saced Flugreisen v. Zentrale zur Beklampfung un-
lauteren Wettbewerbs, 1989 E.C.R. 803.
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either originated or were destined to the country in question."'
In this case, air tickets were being sold in countries where cur-
rency values were low, whereby a transatlantic fare with a stop-
over in Germany ended up to be cheaper than if the ticket was
purchased in and the flight originated from Germany. The
court held that the E.E.C. measures referred to only interna-
tional intra-European flights and that the applicable competi-
tion rules applied to all other carriers fall under the rubric of
Articles 88 and 89 of the Treaty of Rome.11 4 Thus, the decision
was far-reaching in that for the first time the court contemplated
jurisdiction over non-Community carriers that were subject to
the competition rules under the Treaty of Rome.
A second package of regulatory measures was adopted by the
European Commission inJune 1990. The most significant effect
of these measures was giving full support to abolish all bilateral
limits on capacity shares and intra-Community fares by January
1, 1993. Moreover, byJuly 1992, each Member State subject to
these measures was required to formulate a licensing scheme
that fostered the market entry of new airlines that met the li-
censing requirements, thereby opening access to that country's
air routes by other Community airline companies.
The liberalization of air transport in Europe has been initi-
ated at a gradual pace. The importance of outsider competition
that eventually will enter the Community market is a reality
which cannot be underestimated. Already, EFTA and East Euro-
pean countries, not to mention Asian and North American com-
petitors, are defining a role for themselves through multilateral
alliances and global routing cooperatives with selected Euro-
pean Community carriers. The European Commission is in-
creasingly adopting interventionist measures to protect
consumer interests as well. Quite different from what took place
in the United States, small European carriers are not merging to
compete against their more established counterparts. More-
over, there are few newly created carriers in Europe that present
any real competition for established airline companies. If there
is to be any competition in Europe's liberalization process, it is
to be among the existing airline companies. Yet given the alli-
ances being formed among European and non-European coun-
tries, it is doubtful that carriers in a given alliance will compete
113 Id. at 806.
114 Id. at 814; see also CARBAJO & DE Rus, supra note 20, at 40 (discussing signifi-
cance of the case); DOGANIS, supra note 46, at 90.
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against each other. It is apparent that the scale of competition
has evolved to take hold between transnational alliances and
global markets, not between lone air carriers.
IV. THE CASE OF SPAIN: IBERIA AS A NATIONAL
FLAG CARRIER
The law which founded Iberia as Spain's national air carrier is
dated June 7, 1940. Subsequent regulations of 1942 and 1944
expanded on this law, with the essential groundwork establish-
ing exclusive air transport service to the Iberian peninsula, its
territories, and protectorates. Law 48/1960 of July 21, 1960 im-
plicitly expressed the concept that regular national flights were
a public service reserved to national companies." 5 Regular and
international flights are subject to the reciprocity of interna-
tional agreements, thus allowing foreign companies to offer
their services in Spain. 116 The exclusivity of national service to
satisfy national demand used to be an especially common char-
acteristic of most, if not all, national transportation systems that
fulfilled an essential public service. This philosophy underlying
current economic regulation and liberalization has changed
considerably, to the extent that the concept of exclusivity goes
against the free market competition that is being fostered today.
We have entered a period in economic and legal history in
which fostering market competition is believed to engender im-
proved customer services, greater innovation, increased cost-ef-
fectiveness, and more attractive pricing. More recently, airline
companies are encouraging international company linkages, by
which worldwide routing systems are jointly formed to increase
access to and coverage of global markets. Hence, the concept of
exclusive national service no longer exists, to the benefit of "es-
sential transport facilities" consumers who increasingly demand
greater routing flexibility and choice.
Iberia's efforts to achieve global expansion have taken the
form of investing in shares of the following airline companies in
Latin America: Aerolineas Argentinas, Ledeco (Chile), and
Viasa (Venezuela). Iberia has also been in negotiations with
these airlines, trying to realize some of the same objectives as in
the negotiations held with Dominicana.1 7 However, upon peti-
115 LEY DE NAVEGACION AEREA [L.N.A.] arts. 71, 73, 74, and 83 (Esp.).
116 Id. art. 88.
117 In September 1993, Iberia closed its flight distributor hub in the Domini-
can Republic, resulting in the closure of its Miami hub, discontinuation of flights
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tioning a second injection of 130 trillion pesetas in state aid
from the European Commission, the Commission's response
was to grant only 48 billion, of which 36 billion pesetas was des-
tined to finance the social benefits agreement for workers and
12 billion pesetas were to compensate for the restoration and
reduction of aircraft equipment. 18 With few alternatives, Iberia
at one point projected turning to the following sources for ad-
ded financing: 40 billion pesetas resulting from the sale of
Aerolineas Argentinas, and 10 billion pesetas from the sale of
Austral, a subsidiary of Aerolineas Argentinas.11 9 In case of an
added need for financing, Iberia would also consider selling
shares of Viasa Airlines, even though these have proven to be
less marketable than shares of its other acquisitions.1 2 0
A. IBERIA'S SHORTCOMINGS
Evidently, Iberia faces reversing its position from an airline
aspiring to expand its global market to one which reverts to sell-
ing its recent acquisitions in order to survive.1 21 Jfirgen Weber,
President of Lufthansa, commented that in considering an alli-
ance with Iberia unlikely, the Spanish flag carrier would do well
to avoid state aid by reducing its size, and any resulting financ-
ing should be used, not to restructure the company, but to re-
duce its prices. 122 A reduction in prices necessarily will oblige
the carrier to stand on a more competitive ground with those
international carriers that access Iberia's consumer markets.
to Los Angeles, and a reduction of the frequency in connecting flights from the
Buenos Aires hub. Antonio Ruiz del Arbol, Iberia clausura su centro a,~reo de Santo
Domingo y reduce vuelos en Buenos Aires, CINCO DIAS, Sept. 28, 1993, at 8. Airline
financial losses in Central America, the United States, and Japan reached 8 bil-
lion pesetas. Id. At the same time, the intercontinental activities were projected
to experience a loss of at least 23.5 billion pesetas. Id.
118 Xavier Vidal-Folch, Iberia rebaja a 100.000 millones la inyecci6n de capital
necesaria para su plan de viabilidad, EL PMs, Oct. 15, 1995, at 53.
Jig Id.
120 Id.
121 One of the important conditions to a second extension of aid by the E.E.C.
is that of obliging Iberia to agree either to repurchasing sold shares of Aerolieas
Argentinas or totally separating itself from the airline at the end of a two year
period from the date of receiving aid. Iberia pierde hasta octubre 9.035 millones,
5.171 menos de lo provisto, EL PAIS, Nov. 8, 1995, at 59.
122 Bel~n Cebrif.n, Los Gobiernos tienen queprivatizar las compatifas a~reas, EL PATS,
Sept. 3, 1995, at 46 (interview with Jfirgen Weber).
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In a comparative survey, Iberia is cited to be one of the least
productive airlines in the world. 123 Some comparative figures
on productivity rates follow:




























































One observes in Table 1 that in terms of income gains, Iberia
is most comparable with Swissair, at $2,984,967 and $2,931,259
(U.S.). But, while Swissair shows a lower figure for transported
passengers per kilometer, Iberia has more personnel and a
lower productive mileage rating than Swissair. One important
indication exhibited by these figures is that 9,000 extra Iberia
personnel over the Swissair figure may be in excess of actual
company needs. This is not the first time a suggestion has been
made that Iberia could reduce the number of its employees in
order to cut excess company costs. 25 But there are other areas
123 Iberia es una de las lineas a-reas menos productivas del mundo, LA GACETA, Sept.
24, 1990, at 8 (publishing a 1990 Instituto de Transporte A6reo (Spain) Study).
124 Instituto de Transporte Areo (ITA) (Institute of AirTransport) (1990).
125 In 1992, Iberia announced that top management salaries would be frozen.
Antonio Ruiz del Arbol, Iberia decide congelar los sueldos de sus altos cargos y directivos
en 1993, CINcO DiAs, Nov. 5, 1992, at 12. In 1993, Iberia proceeded to freeze its
employee salaries while simultaneously claiming that the salaries of its 1200 pi-
lots, a minority of the company's total 26,500 employees, comprised the greatest
percentage of the total salary figure paid to all employees, pilot salaries being the
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for cutting costs: diminishing or eliminating free travel benefits
amounting to an estimated 430,000 air tickets or 10 billion pese-
tas annually, consumed by Iberia's 23,500 employees and their
relatives, not to mention the added free flight benefits allocated
to high level government officials and parliamentary mem-
bers.12 6 It is also important to note that in 1994 when Iberia
management and employees signed a viability plan to avoid im-
minent bankruptcy, company workers accepted an average sal-
ary cut of 8.5% and a reduction of 3,500 employees in exchange
for the terms and conditions Iberia promised to meet in re-
vamping and restructuring its executive and board management
and business activities. 12 7
B. IBERIA'S STRATEGIES IN THE WAKE OF
EUROPEAN DEREGULATION
Domestic air tariffs in Spain are approved by the Ministry of
Fiscal Affairs, while Iberia's possibilities to invest are controlled
by the Ministry of Industry. This implies that in the absence of a
single authority to decide both tariff and investment issues, it is
often the case that such decisions are based on little coordina-
tion and may sometimes even contradict themselves. Hence,
one suggested strategy for the carrier and its affiliates is to coor-
dinate the decision-making powers affecting them within a sin-
gle governmental or private authority.
laci6n salarial en Iberia marcard la linea al sector piblico, CINCO DIAs, Feb. 25, 1993, at
6. By the end of the same year, Iberia management claimed that it was overstaf-
fed by 132 pilots or 10% of their total number. Antonio Ruiz del Arbol, Iberia dice
a los sindicatos que le sobra el 10% de lospilotos, CINco DIAs, Dec. 10, 1993, at 10. It
may be questioned, however, whether reducing pilot staff alone, in light of their
high salaries, is the soundest and most comprehensive restructuring standard to
use given the following salary comparisons between Aviaco, an Iberia affiliate,
and other airlines:
Pesetas (000,000)
Pilots Flight Attendants Land
British Midland 10.4 3.31 4.07
Air U.K. 10.4 3.31 4.07
Lufthansa City Line 11.5 3.56 -
Aviaco 18.0 5.53 4.75
Germf.n Temprano, Aviaco soporta un sobrecoste salarial de Z000 millones sobre sus
competidoras, GACETA DE LOS NEGOCIOS, Nov. 27, 1995, at 5.
126 Maribel Rodrigo, Iberia: diez mil millones en biletes gratis, EXPANSlON, Sept.
15, 1995, at 6.
127 jTiene sentido Iberia?, EL PAS, Nov. 12, 1995, at 14.
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Other strategies for success would reasonably focus on fully
capturing the north-south European travel market, particularly
that catering to tourism. Along the same principle, charter
flights that cater to the same market will present Iberia with its
greatest competition, especially since in 1988 more than 39 mil-
lion passengers flown into Spain were transported by interna-
tional flights, of which 72.8% were charter, non-regular
flights. 128
At the national level, Iberia and its affiliates currently are the
only carriers servicing regular travel demands. With the onset of
air transport liberalization in Europe and its elimination of li-
censing concessions by Member States, increased competition is
expected from newly established regional European carriers and
from charter companies newly converted to serve regular travel
markets. The more heavily traveled national routes will be af-
fected first. Moreover, national rail, road, and air travel can be
better coordinated through tax incentives and selective invest-
ments in these networks, in order to increase the efficient oper-
ation of Iberia and best meet consumer demands.
At the international level, Iberia's success will depend on the
competitive cost structure it establishes relative to that of Euro-
pean and North American competitors. This will involve what is
already apparent: the need to restructure the company and re-
negotiate salaries in order to lower operating costs. Airport han-
dling activities, moreover, will change from exclusive control to
open competition, thus obliging Iberia to ensure quality con-
trols and innovate airport autohandling methods in order to
continue servicing the desired market while recognizing the in-
evitable entry of competitors to this service area.1 29
V. CONCLUSION
Having compared the distinct deregulation approaches be-
tween Europe and the United States, air transport liberalization
in Europe cannot replicate the United States experience. None-
theless, the progressive relaxation of competition rules by both
the European Commission and bilateral agreements among
Member States will have similar consequences to those exper-
ienced in the United States. Spain, along with other Member
128 CARBAJO & DE Rus, supra note 20, at 45.
129 Carlos Ocafia P6rez de Tudela, Comentarios a las propuestas del Tribunal de
Defensa de la Competencia para la liberalizaci6n de los servicios, 86 CUADERNOS DE IN-
FORmAcj6N ECON6MiCA 42 (1994).
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States, will develop hub-spoke routing, increasingly competitive
tariffs, and, as is permitted under the Commission's authority,
an increase of company mergers to take place on the basis of
purely economic, and not national protectionist, justifications.
In the wake of these deregulation measures, the success of
Iberia Airlines and its affiliates depends greatly on their ability
to maintain a competitive tariff structure relative to costs, espe-
cially in relation to its closest competitors, including but not lim-
ited to charter companies that increasingly will service regular
travel demands. Iberia's success will also depend on its ability
and sustained flexibility over time to introduce new products
into its markets, thus contributing to the European Economic
Community. An eventual transnational alliance also promises to
benefit global consumer groups, even if such an alliance is at
this time a lesser priority than the urgency for Iberia to contain
its costs and compete at maximum efficiency.

